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DECRIMINALIZING BORDER CROSSINGS
Victor C. Romero*
ABSTRACT
An international border crosser should only be deemed a criminal if the
United States government can prove that, with requisite criminal intent, she
engaged in an act aside from crossing the border that would constitute a
crime. No longer should crossing the border be a strict liability criminal
offense. Doing so will restore balance to the civil immigration system,
conserve scarce enforcement resources to target truly criminal behavior,
enhance our standing abroad, and help heal our racially-polarized discourse
on immigration policy.
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I. BORDERS AND THE LAW
Recent national polls suggest that a majority of Americans favor the
controversial Arizona bill' that makes it a criminal trespass for noncitizens
to be present in the state without carrying their immigration documents
with them. 2 The law's relevance may be measured in the number of copy-
cat bills that have been introduced into other state legislatures 3 and some
municipalities 4 of late. Proponents of the law argue that by criminalizing
illegal presence, Arizona will be able to effectively and directly induce un-
documented persons to leave the state, not to return under threat of sanc-
tion. Opponents respond that only the federal government is authorized to
regulate immigration and individual state laws enforced by local police un-
familiar with complex federal immigration laws will inevitably, though un-
1. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), as amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/
summary/h.sb 1070_asamendedbyhb2l62.doc.htm. As of this writing, a partial preliminary
injunction was granted to prevent enforcement of some of the more controversial portions of
the bill, including the criminal "trespass" provision based on undocumented presence. See,
e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Judge Blocks Arizona's Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2010, at Al. Rather than regard this as irrational localist activism, Rick Su sees these sub-
federal anti-immigration initiatives as understandable outgrowths of garden-variety local
concerns that pit current residents against new ones. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Lo-
cal Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008). Keith Aoki, John Shuford,
Kristi Young, and Thomas Hwei, in turn, analyze the same issue from not only the localist
perspective, but from an international perspective as well, contrasting these with the conven-
tional federalism model of analysis. See Keith Aoki et al., (In) Visible Cities: Three Local
Government Models and Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 453 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Paul Steinhauser, Recent Polls: Majority Support Arizona Law, CNN PO-
LITICAL TICKER BLOG (July 6, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/07/
06/recent-polls-majority-support-arizona-law/?fbid=GOSvXVsDsRj. On a related note,
most oppose the federal government's recent lawsuit claiming that S.B. 1070 is preempted
by federal immigration law and policy. See, e.g., Michael Muskal, Poll: Most Americans
Oppose Federal Suit to Block Arizona Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES BLOG (July 9, 2010,
8:11 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dcnow/2010/07/poll-most-americans-oppose-
federal-suit-to-block-arizona-immigration-law.html.
3. See, e.g., Marcelo Ballv6, Arizona Law Spurs Copycat Legislation, NEW AM. MEDIA
(May 3, 2010), http://newamericamedia.org/2010/05/arizonas-immigration-law-spurs-
copycat-legislation.php.
4. While the Hazleton, Pennsylvania anti-immigrant ordinance may be the best known,
the Irondale, Alabama resolution noting that police officers should ascertain traffic arres-
tees' immigration status may be one of the most recent. See Victoria L. Coman, Irondale
Passes Resolution on Immigration Status Checks, ALA. LIVE BLOG, (July 6, 2010, 11:38
PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/07/irondale_passesresolutionon.html.
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intentionally, resort to racial and ethnic profiling, especially in states with
sizeable undocumented Latino populations.
Missing from this dialogue, however, is a serious re-examination of ex-
isting federal laws that criminalize border crossings. Constitutional immi-
gration jurisprudence has long held that Congress's plenary power legiti-
mately vests in the federal political branches the sovereign authority to
exclude and deport noncitizens, even on racially discriminatory grounds.
5
On a related note, Fourth Amendment law generally recognizes that race
may be a factor in deciding whether immigration officers have a reasonable
suspicion that a person is undocumented. 6 Accordingly, most people ac-
cept the idea that Congress can reasonably decide to criminalize the very
act of crossing the United States border, whether from Mexico or Canada.
This essay challenges conventional wisdom by arguing for the decrimi-
nalization of international border crossings into the United States, leaving
this regulation to the civil enforcement realm. A border crosser should on-
ly be deemed a criminal if the federal government can prove that, with re-
quisite criminal intent, she engaged in an act aside from crossing the border
that would constitute a crime. No longer should crossing the border be a
strict liability crime.
To make this case, I examine the broader concept of "border crossings"
in an effort to discern the underlying moral and practical reasons for when
and why American society chooses to criminalize such conduct.7 The ten-
dency to favor strict liability regimes stems from the desire to aid law en-
forcement in its battle against more serious border crimes-human traffick-
ing, for instance-by relaxing the standard for proving that a crime has
been committed. If catching a person close to the border is enough to rend-
er her a criminal suspect, then law enforcement automatically has an oppor-
tunity to investigate and discern whether she has violated some other crime.
While a useful tool, strict liability regimes also create the temptation to
charge the innocent border crosser-the one who has committed no other
crime-with the strict liability crime of border crossing. Although one
would hope such decisions would be made only when the government
strongly suspects but cannot prove more nefarious activity, such power
should be severely limited in the immigration context, where the law un-
iformly treats noncitizens less favorably than citizens as a default. To err
on the side of criminalizing innocent border crossings only adds to the
stigma that already plagues undocumented persons, most of whom are una-
5. See infra Part II.A. 1.
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
7. See infra Part I.B.
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ble to meet our stringent requirements for admission, and once here, be-
come productive members of our society.
A. A Broader Perspective on Borders and Law: Lessons From a
Traffic Stop
To invoke the law is to invoke a border between legal and illegal con-
duct, a bright line that separates the owner from the trespasser, the citizen
from the foreigner. Children in affluent societies learn from a very early
age to invoke the law and borders when they scream, "that toy is mine!"-
clutching their favorite toy close to their chest while sternly warning-"...
and I'm going to tell Dad you tried to get it!" Similarly, in the United
States, the idea of demarcating and respecting private property boundaries
finds protection in our Constitution's due process clauses.8 Additionally,
all over the world, albeit to differing degrees, nation states recognize the
importance of territorial sovereignty that boundaries help define and sup-
port. From the personal, to the corporate, to the global, the law helps give
borders shape and substance, contributing to the ordering of civilized socie-
ty.
Three policy questions emerge from a discussion of law and borders.
First, when should the law formally recognize a border, whether personal
or corporate, private or public? Second, when is that border unlawfully
transgressed by another's actions? And third, what legal consequence
should follow that border transgression? In sum, these questions focus on
the reason for, the breach of and the consequences of breaching the bor-
der.
To put these questions in context, consider the following example. The
Fourth Amendment recognizes that we each enjoy a right to be free from
unreasonable governmental searches.9 This provision ensures that law en-
forcement respects individual privacy. A clear example of a Fourth
Amendment violation would be if the government, without a warrant, ran-
sacks your house looking for contraband, causing extensive damage to your
property, but finding nothing.' 0
While seemingly clear on its face, this border between private space and
legitimate police action is a highly contested one. To tease this issue out,
8. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (requiring that due process be served before life, liber-
ty, or property may be taken by the government).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (recognizing a constitutional tort cause of action for violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
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my encounter with a Los Angeles police officer should help illustrate this
murky line even further.
When I was a first-year law student, I was legitimately stopped by a po-
lice officer on a California freeway en route to the Los Angeles airport to
pick up my girlfriend. I had recently moved to Los Angeles from New
York, had not driven in months, and was borrowing a friend's car. It was
evening on the busy Los Angeles freeways and my driving was less than
stellar. Seeing the patrol car's flashing lights in my rearview mirror, I ob-
ediently pulled over and waited anxiously for the officer to approach.
Having studied and taught Criminal Procedure, I know now (though I
probably would have expected it then) that even though this was not my
car, I enjoyed a privacy interest in it; therefore, the officer could not enter
the car to search it without my permission or some other legitimate
excuse.l' There was a legal border between the officer and me, which he
knew about, and I, at the time, instinctively assumed.
And so, I was a bit surprised when the officer's first words to me were,
"I smell marijuana in there." Not "how are you doing this evening?" or "is
everything all right?" but, "I smell marijuana in there." Because of my er-
ratic driving, perhaps the officer suspected that I might be under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol. Maybe the car was the type used by drug gangs;
maybe driving toward the airport was another clue that I was a drug runner.
Based on his experience, the officer may have been preparing for the worst.
This would all have been reasonable and admirable police work, except
that the car did not smell of marijuana, I had not been smoking marijuana,
and I was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Looking back on the
incident, I can only conclude that the officer made this story up so he
would have a legitimate reason to search the car.
Upon hearing this, I quickly but politely denied that I was under the in-
fluence and calmly explained the reasons for my erratic driving, apologiz-
ing contritely. I presented my valid New York driver's license and con-
fessed to my unfamiliarity with both my friend's car and Los Angeles
driving conditions. The officer's face softened slightly, letting me go with
an admonition to drive more carefully.
Going back to our three questions regarding the reason for, the breach
of and the consequences of breaching the border, this story (1) involves a
law that establishes a border protecting the individual from unlawful go-
vernmental conduct; (2) allows for an exception that privileges an officer's
11. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (holding that all passen-
gers in a car have standing to challenge a stop, not just the driver); accord Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 133-36 (1978) (noting the owner of a car has standing to challenge a search of
the car).
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warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer smells drugs; but otherwise,
(3) recognizes possible sanctions against the officer if the search is not rea-
sonable.
Here, no search was conducted and the officer respected the border be-
tween us. Yet, what do we make of the officer's false allegation that he
smelled marijuana? Some might argue that his actions were entirely justi-
fiable because if he found drugs, then his "error" was harmless, and if he
did not, I would be in the same position anyway, save the extra time of hav-
ing had to endure a vehicle search. Officers put themselves in harm's way
daily; as between the innocent driver and the harried cop-on-the-beat,
shouldn't the law err in the officer's favor? But another view would be to
question the legitimacy of condoning dishonest, if pragmatic, tactics by
those charged with upholding our laws. Isn't the very purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to ensure that law enforcement officers obey the law?
Carefully examining the contested nature of legal borders in this broader
context helps illuminate our understanding of the similarly fluid legal
boundaries involved in international border crossings. In important ways,
negotiating the personal border between the police officer and me provides
insight into the policing of our shared borders with Canada and Mexico.
Imagine border patrol officers encountering a group of Mexicans in the
Sonora Desert, just on this side of the United States-Mexico border. Al-
though none of them are criminals- they simply seek better economic op-
portunities in the United States-like me and my erratic driving, the Mex-
icans have engaged in unlawful conduct: they have crossed the border in an
unauthorized place. Like the Los Angeles police officer who stopped me,
these border patrol officers would have several law enforcement options,
including (1) transporting the Mexicans back to the other side of the border,
with a warning (not unlike my situation); (2) prior to their transport, noting
on their record that they had entered the country surreptitiously, rendering
them presumptively barred from future entry under civil immigration sta-
tutes (analogous to an infraction, perhaps meriting a civil fine and driver's
license repercussions); or (3) detain them and recommend that they be
prosecuted criminally for entering without inspection.
While the first two options have direct parallels to the potential legal
consequences in my traffic stop story-a warning, in one case, and an ad-
ministrative penalty, in another-the third does not. Absent the officer ac-
tually making good on his hunch and finding drugs in the car, I would not
have been charged with a crime. Our current immigration law is different,
however. Option three would allow immigration officials to charge border
crossers with a federal misdemeanor for their first offense, and a felony for
[Vol. XX-XVIII
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repeat offenders. 12 Why the third option of a possible strict liability crimi-
nal offense in the international border crossing scenario? Perhaps just as
excusing as "harmless error" a police officer's "white lie" that he "smelled
marijuana" would facilitate drug prosecutions, relieving officers of the ne-
cessity to prove criminal intent would enhance border policing.
But such an argument only makes sense if we ignore the existence of op-
tion two. Recall that administrative penalties already exist to handle the
garden-variety border-crosser, the undocumented worker who comes to the
United States to earn a living. Shifting back to my traffic stop story, if we
accept that erratic driving and drug possession are two distinct crimes, our
Fourth Amendment laws are correct to establish privacy borders protecting
careless drivers from overzealous "drug-sniffing" officers. Put another
way, society recognizes that careless driving and drug possession are two
different matters and should be handled differently. In the immigration
context, however, this distinction disappears, for Congress has seen it fit to
establish both civil, administrative penalties (option two) as well as crimi-
nal consequences (option three) for the same conduct--entry without in-
spection.
Even if one accepts that illegal border crossing is categorically more of-
fensive than erratic driving or speeding (and I am not conceding this, for
reasons I will explore more thoroughly below), one has to ask what is
gained and what is lost by adding a criminal sanction to the civil adminis-
trative consequences of an act. As mentioned earlier, one prominent argu-
ment for criminal penalties is that they make policing easier. Like the pass
for a "white lie" or warrantless search, a strict liability criminal law regime
relieves the government of the burden of proving criminal intent, that the
border crosser had some nefarious motive in entering the United States sur-
reptitiously apart from the purpose to physically cross the border unnoticed.
Two negative consequences attend such a choice, however. First, be-
cause border crossers can be labeled criminals automatically, this shifts the
public discourse from one of empathy to indifference, or possibly disgust;
hence, criminalizing conduct that is otherwise sanctioned by civil penalty
further marginalizes noncitizens already at the fringes of United States law
and culture. And second, just as in my encounter with the well-meaning
Los Angeles police officer, enacting criminal provisions when civil penal-
ties will do offends constitutional safeguards of individual liberty by tempt-
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (misdemeanor provision); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006)
(felony provision). Unlawful entry has been a crime since 1929. See Act of Mar. 4, 1929,
ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551; see also United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that unlawful entry crime is complete at the time a noncitizen gains entry
through an unlawful point and does not submit to an examination).
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ing law enforcement to overreach. I will discuss each of these critiques in
the next section.
B. When the Border Becomes the Law: "What Part of Illegal Don't
You Understand?"
Ever since 9/11, there has been a national obsession over identifying
possible terrorist and criminal threats to our country, and immigration poli-
cy has been viewed as an effective tool toward that end. In describing his
agency's actions following the 9/11 attacks, then Attorney General John
Ashcroft famously declared in December 2001, "[m]y message to America
this morning, then, is this: If you fit this definition of a terrorist, fear the
United States, for you will lose your liberty."' 3 In the same speech, Ash-
croft outlined how the Department of Justice had relied on the USA PA-
TRIOT Act, immigration controls, and other law enforcement tools to root
out terrorism suspects. 14 Nonetheless, he also warned against "fear mon-
gering": "To those who pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens
against noncitizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms
of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they
erode our national unity and diminish our resolve."' 5
In Ashcroft's remarks, we see the tension inherent in using immigration
law as a tool for enforcing criminal laws. Ashcroft realized that immi-
grants are generally not terrorists or criminals; yet, he felt a responsibility
to ensure that any noncitizens who were terrorists or criminals did not es-
cape the government's notice.16 His warnings, again stereotyping immi-
grants as terrorists, speak to that fine line between rational and hysterical
policing.
I wonder, however, whether the post-9/11 phenomenon of anti-
immigrant law-making at both the federal and local level has been driven
more by fear and perception rather than the sober analysis Ashcroft's re-
marks call for. In a 2003 article, Kevin Johnson predicted that the federal
government's focus on immigration enforcement as an anti-terrorism tool
would lead to the demonization of noncitizens generally, with a disparate
13. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 313 (2001)
(statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States), available at http://www.
justice.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
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impact upon Mexican immigrants in particular.17 My own experiences
suggest that Dean Johnson was right. Upon receiving the following e-mails
in September 2004, I realized that negative feelings regarding undocu-
mented border crossers had turned increasingly bitter:
Dear Sir,
Illegal immigrants are in this country illegally, regardless of whether they
have jobs that "nobody else wants". Would you excuse a rapist on the
grounds that he has a job "nobody else wants"?
I applaud the efforts of the [Pennsylvania] police to enforce the law, re-
gardless of who breaks it. This has nothing to do with racism or racial
profiling. It has to do with lawbreaking.., which you, as a law profes-
sor, ought to be concerned about. 1
8
Another correspondent noted:
I read of you being upset that the feds have started enforcing laws by at
least giving some small effort to rounding up illegals. Just one question
for you ... if, because one is mexican [sic] (and really no other reason),
you thereby have a right to break which law(s) you want to break, i.e., be-
ing here ILLEGALLY, then can I, as a middle-class actual citizen pick
and choose which laws I want to obey? I am thinking I would like to dis-
obey the "breaking into a bank and stealing other people's money" law.
Since it would help me financially to break into a bank and steal other
people's money, using your logic, I should be able to-right? Very so-
phisticated logic you use to denounce the feds, who have too long ignored
massive hordes of illegal mexicans [sic] breaking the law in OUR coun-
try. After this e-mail, I will be e-mailing Bush to ask him if he can quit
sucking up to big business (and their lust for cheap illegal labor) long
enough to start focusing on deporting more, and hopefully all, illegals.
You might try actually to actually use LOGIC in your thinking, since you
are a professor and all .... 19
Perhaps naively, I was not expecting the barely-concealed anger seething
in these e-mail reactions to my comments published in a September 2004
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article about Pennsylvania's Stop Terrorism on Pa-
trol (STOP) campaign. 20 As reported in the Post-Gazette, the STOP initia-
tive allowed state troopers conducting routine traffic stops to request immi-
gration documents from persons whom they suspected of being here
17. See Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 849, 850-52 (2003).
18. E-mail to author, (Sept. 26, 2004, 20:33 EST) (on file with author).
19. E-mail to Author (Sep. 26, 2004, 23:00 EST) (on file with author).
20. Paula Reed Ward, Troopers Snare Illegal Aliens on Interstates 80, 79, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 2004, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04270/384914.
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illegally.21 I told the reporter I was skeptical of state efforts to effectively
enforce federal immigration law, given that migrants of color would be the
most likely targets of such profiling; instead of terrorists, cops were proba-
bly going to catch Latino migrant workers who took jobs U.S. workers
would not.
22
Having taught and written on race and immigration for several years, I
knew my views would be difficult to capture in a few newspaper quotes
and would not be very popular, but I was little prepared for the strident and
disturbing rhetoric employed by a few of my correspondents (including one
who tracked down my phone number, leaving me an angry voicemail).
Their argument goes something like this:
As a sovereign nation, the United States has the right to protect its bor-
ders. Mexicans and others have violated those borders by sneaking in il-
legally rather than by waiting their turn like everyone else. These illegals
are criminals. They have stolen jobs from hard-working citizens, under-
cutting wages in the process. It is therefore entirely reasonable for us to
use all public resources at our disposal, whether federal, state, or local, to
send them back to where they came from. Even assuming they're taking
jobs no one wants, that's irrelevant; their illegal status means they have no
legal right to work here. This is not racial profiling; it's furthering respect
for the rule of law. To call this profiling insults the hard work of law en-
forcement officers who put themselves in harm's way to keep this country
safe day in and day out.
That experience in September 2004 was an eye-opener for me. It
marked the first time I noticed a palpable shift in our discourse around im-
migration policy, where, instead of calmly debating the issues, people be-
gan to attack each other personally, conflating and confusing the position
with the person. In a country where a robust right of free speech has long
been a hallmark of democracy, similar rhetorical fights are being waged
over socialism and the welfare state, abortion and gender equality, race and
affirmative action, and the rights of sexual minorities. Concerns about im-
migration are no exception.
Yet, I wonder whether anti-immigrant restrictionists feel particularly
vindicated because the law provides an "option three"--the option to treat
border crossers as criminals? My sense is that it has, and indeed, this has
also led to the proliferation of anti-immigrant legislation by states and local
governments, especially of late. Although Arizona's S.B. 107023 is but the
latest example, states and localities frustrated with the Bush and Obama
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
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administrations' apparent inability to pass comprehensive immigration
reform have taken matters into their own hands.
The thinking goes as follows: if, like my e-mail correspondents, most of
the public feels justified in marginalizing undocumented persons because
our immigration laws criminalize such conduct, and if state and local poli-
ticians wish to send Washington a message about immigration reform, then
laws like Arizona's become more understandable and politically feasible, if
arguably morally suspect. Put differently, if undocumented persons are
criminals under federal law, then treating them as criminals under state law
appears reasonable. In Arizona's case, if S.B. 107024 renders undocu-
mented persons criminal trespassers under state law, this simply reflects the
federal government's decision to treat illegal border crossings as a criminal
offense.
Of course, an overarching policy question still remains: why make illeg-
al border crossings criminal when administrative sanctions are readily
available? Why risk the piling on and overreaching by private individuals
and non-federal public entities based largely on the legal imprimatur bes-
towed by the Immigration and Nationality Act upon the criminalization of
border crossings? Put differently, why should the border become the law,
the law and the border essentially merging into one with criminal sanction
as the linchpin of enforcement?
To be clear, state and local private and public entities have not been the
only ones that have accepted the popular notion that undocumented persons
are de facto dangerous criminals; indeed, the federal government has long
struggled with separating fact from fiction in formulating a just immigra-
tion policy, from time-to-time erring on the side of treating civil immigra-
tion law more like criminal law. 25 While Arizona's law has been uniformly
pilloried by civil liberties advocates as an example of state chauvinism
gone wild, a careful examination of the three federal branches of govern-
ment reveals a long-standing tension between preserving sovereignty and
according fair treatment to foreign nationals. The track record of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, Congress, and the Presidency on immigration
policy and enforcement will be examined in the next section.
24. See id.
25. See infra Part I.B.
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II. LIVING IN A CRIMMIGRATION2 6 NATION
While in this post-Brown v. Board of Education27 era, we have come to
accept equality as a touchstone of constitutional jurisprudence, all three
branches of the federal government have supported the idea that immigra-
tion law and policy is exceptional, and that much leeway is to be given the
national sovereign in its dealings with foreign citizens. So while de jure
segregation based on race is no longer acceptable, divisions based on citi-
zenship define what immigration law and policy is about. To the extent
that one's immigrant status happens to coincide with some other outsider
status like race, poverty, or criminality, immigration law becomes a ready
proxy for weeding out undesirables, as the targeting of Arabs and Muslims
after 9/11 bears out.
Fortunately, the United States Constitution, while it clearly preserves our
sovereignty by differentiating citizens from others, also requires that all
"persons"--not just citizens-be afforded due process and equal treatment
under the law. The challenge then is for all three federal branches to pro-
mote an immigration policy that seeks to balance the importance of main-
taining a sovereign nation that values its citizenry against the desire to en-
sure fair treatment of those guests who reside therein.
A. Supreme Court Complicity
1. The Plenary Power Doctrine
As the final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning,28 the United States
Supreme Court has long held that immigration policy resides in the national
government, with Congress primarily responsible for defining that policy
and the President responsible for enforcing it. Deliberately, the Court has
taken a back seat, declaring that laws regarding the exclusion and expulsion
of noncitizens from the United States are the political branches' preroga-
26. Although this essay focuses on the criminalization of border crossings, much
thoughtful work has been done on the criminalization of immigration law in general. See,
e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring
the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Re-
lief and the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367
(2006).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating it is the
Court's prerogative to "say what the law is").
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tive, and that the judiciary therefore has no business substituting its judg-
ment for theirs.2
9
In two landmark cases from the late 1800s, the Supreme Court firmly
entrenched in Congress's hands the power to exclude and expel nonciti-
zens. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,30 the plaintiff was a Chinese la-
borer who had lived in the United States for many years and wished to re-
turn to China temporarily. 31 Prior to his departure, he secured a certificate
of return from United States authorities, which he was instructed to present
at port when he got back.32 During his time abroad, Congress passed the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, forbidding any further entry of Chinese na-
tionals 33 on the ground that there were too many of them in the United
States after the completion of their work on the westward expansion of the
railway system. 34 Upon the plaintiffs return to the United States, he pre-
sented his previously-issued certificate of return. 35 Rather than accept this
as valid, authorities confiscated and revoked it, citing the intervening Chi-
nese Exclusion Act as representing the government's new policy.
36
Despite the absence of a war between China and the United States, or of
evidence to suggest that the plaintiffs were anything other than upstanding
citizens, the Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act, deferring to the polit-
ical branches' power to retroactively apply the Act to these returning resi-
dents.37 Indeed, the Court gave effect to Congress's conclusion that all
Chinese, including returning United States residents, were an unassimilable
security threat:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are
no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. 38
Such a determination is "conclusive upon the judiciary." 39
A short four years later, the Court extended Congress's plenary power to
include the deportation as well as the exclusion of noncitizens. In Fong
29. See id.
30. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
31. Seeid. at 582.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 599.
34. See id. at 594-95.
35. See id. at 582.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 606-07.
38. Id. at 606.
39. Id.
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Yue Ting v. United States,40 another provision of the Chinese Exclusion Act
was called into question.4 1 To avoid deportation, Chinese residents were
required to prove that they had lived in the United States for at least one
year. 42 The one catch was that a "credible white witness" had to be pro-
duced to vouch for the Chinese resident.4 3 Congress believed that it would
be easy for the Chinese to find compatriots who would lie for them; in their
view, the Chinese were easily corruptible. If true, Congress could have
remedied this simply by asking for a "credible witness" only, regardless of
race and national origin. Plaintiff Fong was able to produce only a Chinese
witness and was therefore found to be deportable.'
Faced once again with articulating the scope of congressional power
over immigration issues, the Court viewed exclusion and deportation as
two sides of the same coin:
The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been na-
turalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country,
rests upon the same grounds [as exclusion], and is as absolute and unqua-
lified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.45
Aside from the white witness requirement, another racial aspect to this case
is that even though the Court faulted plaintiffs for not choosing to natural-
ize, under applicable law at the time, the Chinese were not permitted to be-
come United States citizens.46
Taken together, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting formed the basis
for what is now called the "plenary power" doctrine-the idea that Con-
gress has virtually absolute power to determine immigration policy, includ-
ing whom to exclude and expel, even if those decisions might be based on
questionable criteria like race and national origin, rather than assessing in-
dividual dangerousness.4 7
40. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
41. See id. at 703.
42. See id. at 698 n. 1.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 703.
45. Id. at 707.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
47. Jack Chin argues that the plenary power doctrine's racist history was simply a ref-
lection of racism in domestic law at the time. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitu-
tional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race
and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There A Plenary Power Doc-
trine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptional-
ism: Commentary On Is There A Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307(2000). Taking a less optimistic view, Kevin Johnson has argued that United States immi-
gration law reflects the citizenry's true feelings toward domestic minorities by enshrining
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While certainly understandable in terms of maintaining a principled se-
paration of powers among the three branches, and justifiably practical giv-
en that Congress is the lawmaking body charged with developing a work-
ing immigration policy, the plenary power doctrine has been used to shield
prejudicial policies from judicial scrutiny, threatening individual liberty in
the process. Let us examine one historical example from the 1950s and a
more contemporary one from the post-9/11 era.
In Shaughnessy v. Mezei,48 a twenty-five year resident from Europe de-
cided to visit his ailing mother for nineteen months in Rumania.49 Upon
his return to the United States, he was indefinitely detained on Ellis Island
because he was adjudged a security risk due to his time behind the Iron
Curtain. 50 Mezei filed suit, claiming that he was denied a meaningful hear-
ing to address these allegations. 51 The Supreme Court upheld the deten-
tion, rejecting Mezei's due process claim.52 Despite his prior twenty-five
year residence in the United States, Mezei was viewed in the same light as
a new immigrant entering the country for the first time. Citing another
Cold War precedent, the Court noted, "[w]hatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned. ' 53
This abdication of judicial authority to review Mezei's potential indefi-
nite detention on Ellis Island was criticized bitterly by the dissent. Justice
Jackson skeptically questioned the government's assertion that Mezei was
free to leave:
Government counsel ingeniously argued that Ellis Island is his 'refuge'
whence he is free to take leave in any direction except west. That might
mean freedom, if only he were an amphibian! Realistically, this man is
incarcerated by a combination of forces which keeps him as effectually as
a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being the United
States immigration authority. 54
discrimination based on race, gender, class, and sexual orientation in immigration law,
which, by virtue of the plenary power doctrine, allows for discrimination against noncitizens
on a wide variety of grounds not accepted within domestic law. See generally KEVIN R.
JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) [herei-
nafter JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES MYTH].
48. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
49. Id. at 208.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 209.
52. Id. at 215-16.
53. Id. at 212 (citing Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
54. Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Although the Court has periodically asserted due process as a constitu-
tional ground for overriding some immigration decisions,55 this general de-
ference to Congress and the President in the fashioning of immigration pol-
icy continues today, especially in cases where, as in Mezei, the government
asserts a national security threat posed by a noncitizen. A more recent ex-
ample appears in Iqbal v. Ashcrofi.56
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a constitutional law
claim made by a Pakistani national against the federal government. 57 Java-
id Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim man detained as part of John Ashcroft's post-
9/11 anti-terrorism sweep, claimed that Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller discriminated against Arabs and Muslims during the round-up be-
cause they knew a disproportionately high number of those detained would
be from these groups. 58 Like in Mezei, no evidence had been produced to
prove he was a terrorist; indeed, unlike many suspected terrorists who were
typically incarcerated indefinitely in Guantanamo, Iqbal was simply de-
ported home.59
The Court dismissed the claims against Ashcroft and Muller, holding
that it was not enough for them to know that Arabs and Muslims would be
disproportionately represented among the terrorism suspects, but that Iqbal
needed to prove that the defendants purposefully intended to target Arabs
and Muslims because of their race, national origin, and religion.60 Rather
than invidious discrimination, the Court reasoned that Ashcroft and Muel-
ler's intent was to detain all noncitizens who might be terror suspects, and
that Iqbal was included in the sweep not because of his race, national ori-
gin, or religion, but because he was a "suspected terrorist." 61 Yet, nothing
in Iqbal's background suggests that he was a terrorist; that the government
chose to deport him rather than detain and try him suggests that they knew
he was not a terrorist. Indeed, the only characteristics linking him to the
9/11 suspects were his race, national origin, and religion. 62 Just as Mezei
was rendered immediately suspect because of his travels in communist ter-
ritory, so was Iqbal deemed a security threat simply because he fit a profile.
55. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding that due process hearing
is required for excluded lawful permanent resident who made only a brief trip to Mexico).
56. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
57. See id. at 1954.
58. See id. at 1944.
59. See id. at 1943.
60. See id. at 1952.
61. See id. at 1951-52.
62. As I explain in a recent essay, Iqbal had pleaded guilty to a minor forgery offense,
but the government had not proven that the incident bore any relation to terrorist activity.
See Victor C. Romero, Interrogating Iqbal, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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Reluctant to hinder the government's war on terror, the Court was willing
to dismiss instead the civil liberties claims of an individual whose legal sta-
tus was marginalized and compromised by his foreign nationality.63
Aside from this broad deference to Congress in immigration matters, the
Court has also condoned the use of race as a factor in aiding presidential
and agency enforcement of the law. As we will discover in the next sec-
tion, preserving racial profiling as a law enforcement tool has arguably
made it more palatable for courts to pass the buck, leaving the balancing of
rights and responsibilities in individual cases to the administration.
2. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence on "Alien " Profiling
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,64 federal border patrol agents
stopped a vehicle traveling near the United States-Mexico border based
solely on the fact that its occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent and
were therefore possibly illegal border crossers.65 Upon stopping the ve-
hicle, agents discovered that their suspicions were correct and Brignoni-
Ponce, the driver, was subsequently charged with smuggling undocu-
mented persons into the United States.66 Brignoni-Ponce challenged the
conviction, claiming that it was illegal for the officers to stop his car solely
on the grounds that he and his companions appeared to be Mexican. 67 The
Supreme Court agreed.68 While recognizing that border patrol officers
could use a suspect's Latino appearance as one factor in deciding whether
to briefly inquire about one's immigration status, relying on race alone was
impermissible:
[Apparent Mexican ancestry] alone would justify neither a reasonable be-
lief that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of native
born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified
with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area, a relatively small
proportion of them are aliens. 69
With Pandora's Box now open, Brignoni-Ponce paved the way for wide-
spread use of racial profiling in the immigration context, notwithstanding
the Court's admonition that it should play but a minor role in determining
63. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
64. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
65. See id. at 874.
66. See id. at 875.
67. See id. at 885-86.
68. See id. at 886.
69. Id.
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reasonable suspicion.70  First, Brignoni-Ponce legitimized the idea that
there exists a Mexican phenotype, when, in truth, Mexicans, like many oth-
er nationalities, are extremely diverse in their racial makeup. 71 In addition,
a study of immigration enforcement in the years following Brignoni-Ponce
revealed that, in practice, the Court's articulation of a broad range of non-
race-based factors encouraged immigration officers to supply reasons justi-
fying a stop after they had begun to interview a suspect.72 As such, even
when lower courts have criticized law enforcement for its inappropriate use
of race as a factor, they have sometimes upheld traffic stops because of the
proper use of other Brignoni-Ponce criteria. In United States v. Montero-
Camargo,73 for instance, the Ninth Circuit criticized the border patrol's re-
liance on "the Hispanic appearance of the vehicle['s] occupants" because
the search was conducted in an area heavily populated by lawful Latino
residents, although the court ultimately concluded that other race-neutral
factors justified the stop. 74
When viewed through the lens of United States immigration history,
federal court deference to the political branches in both the construction of
immigration policy and the federal enforcement of immigration law has led
to an increasing preoccupation with our southern border, as the next section
illustrates.
B. Congress and the Criminalization of Federal Immigration Law
Prior to the federalization of United States immigration law in 1875, in-
dividual states restricted immigration by establishing qualitative barriers to
70. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious La-
wyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1024-42 (2010) (criticizing Brignoni-Ponce and its progeny for
legitimizing racial profiling in law enforcement); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. John-
son, Profiling's Enabler: High Court Ruling Underpins Arizona Immigration Law, WASH.
POST, July 13, 2010, at A 15 (arguing that Brignoni-Ponce's approval of racial profiling con-
tributed to the recent Arizona law's apparent popularity), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071204049.html. For more
on the tension between the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectations and federal immigra-
tion enforcement, see, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens ": Privacy Expectations and
the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1137 (2008).
71. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1025.
72. Edwin Harwood, Arrests Without Warrant: The Legal and Organizational Environ-
ment of Immigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 531 (1984).
73. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
74. See id. at 1128; see also United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 936 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding Montero-Camargo inapplicable because the United States-Canada bor-
der area was not heavily populated by Latinos).
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entry on the basis of criminal activity, poverty and disability, contagious
disease, race and slavery, and ideological grounds; some states also re-
quired that noncitizens register as a prerequisite to entry.75
When Congress began to assert its federal immigration power, qualita-
tive grounds were also the focus; it was not until the 1920s that quantitative
restrictions were established against Europeans and Asians, with Mexicans
and other western hemisphere residents exempt from quota.
76
As historian Mae Ngai observes:
Notwithstanding Congress's absolute power over admission and expul-
sion, as a practical matter mass immigration from Europe faced few legal
impediments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century .... De-
spite the growing list of excludable categories, the Immigration Service
excluded only 1 percent of the 25 million immigrants from Europe who
arrived in the United States from 1880 to World War I.
77
By the advent of World War I, however, political resentment of "hyphe-
nated Americans," especially German-Americans, and the maturing econ-
omy of the United States coincided with the emerging primacy of the na-
tion-state, leading to the widespread adoption of passport and migration
controls in both the United States and Europe.
78
Aside from the Chinese Exclusion Act of the late 1800s, wartime legisla-
tion of the 1910s restricted the movement of eastern and southern Euro-
peans, followed by the first quantitative limit on immigration in May 1921,
when Congress passed an emergency measure curtailing total migration to
355,000 per year.79 By 1924, Congress established a permanent national
origins quota system that favored the English over other Europeans, barred
East and South Asians from entry and citizenship, and exempted western
hemisphere nations, including Mexico, from these quotas. 80 Reflecting the
domestic politics of the time, United States immigration policy favored
whites over non-whites, both qualitatively and quantitatively. "If Congress
did not go so far as to sponsor race breeding, it did seek to transform immi-
gration law into an instrument of mass racial engineering."
81
75. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1833-83 (1993) (describing general categories of
state exclusionary grounds).
76. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 50 (2004).
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
81. NGAI, supra note 76, at 27; see also JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES MYTH, supra note
47 (tracing the legacy of racism and exclusion reflected in the history of U.S. immigration
policy).
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This brief history of federal immigration policy from the mid-i 870s to
the early 1920s paints a picture of a Congress determined to help keep the
United States racially homogeneous through qualitative and quantitative
restrictions on European and Asian immigration, with the notable exception
of the western hemisphere nations. But why the exemption for Latin
America, especially if we consider modern sensibilities post-Brignoni-
Ponce, where "Mexican appearance" tends to evoke the unflattering, pre-
judicial image of the brown-skinned illegal border crosser? The reason is
political: Euro-Americans likely did not consider Mexicans their equals,
but neither did they believe it feasible to impose quotas upon their southern
neighbors without also restricting Canadian migration. Add to this the
need for Mexican agricultural labor in the southwest and we have a clearer
picture as to why Latin America was exempt from the national origins re-
strictions of the 1924 Act.82
This is not to say that Mexicans did not suffer discrimination even then.
Euro-Americans' perceived "manifest destiny" led to the annexation of
Mexican land in Texas and California-sometimes by conquest, sometimes
by intermarriage between wealthy Anglos and Mexicans-resulting in the
assimilation and homogenization of the Mexican elite. From 1900 to 1920,
the westward migration of midwestern Anglo farmers and the northward
movement of rural laborers fleeing the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920
led to the class and racial dichotomy currently existing in the agricultural
southwest today, with white property owners employing unskilled landless
Mexican laborers. 83
The United States-Mexico border during the first two decades of the
twentieth century was not the militarized zone we know today. "Before the
1920s the Immigration Service paid little attention to the nation's land bor-
ders because the overwhelming majority of immigrants entering the United
States landed at Ellis Island and other seaports."8 4 Rather than patrolling
the southern border, immigration inspectors assumed that market demands
for Mexican labor would regulate migration; the government also described
the southern states as the Mexicans' "natural habitat," begrudgingly ac-
knowledging their claims to their former homeland to justify its lax en-
82. NGAI, supra note 76, at 50-51.
83. Seeid. at 51-52.
84. Id. at 64; accord PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DI-
VIDE 32 (2000) ("Whereas formal, legal entry was a complicated process, crossing the bor-
der illegally was relatively simple and largely overlooked.").
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forcement policies.85 Indeed, Mexicans were not even required to apply for
admission at ports of entry until 1919.86
But with the advent of the national origins quota system and the barred
Asiatic zone in the 1920s, deportation became the preferred remedy for
immigration violations, eventually leading to the criminalization of border
crossings. In the 1924 Act, Congress eliminated the statute of limitations
on deportation, providing for the removal of any person who arrived with-
out inspection or without a valid visa after July 1, 1924.87 In 1929, Con-
gress added a criminal sanction to the deportation remedy, making it a
crime for anyone to cross the border without inspection-a misdemeanor
charge for first-time offenders, a felony conviction for recidivists.
88
The 1920s emphasis on numerical restriction, deportation, and criminal
enforcement eventually led to the association of illegal immigration with
Mexican immigration despite Mexicans' then-exemption from quota rules.
Due to the advent of these more stringent laws, many Europeans began hir-
ing smugglers to help them enter the United States from across both the
Canadian and Mexican borders. By the late 1920s, however, ineligible Eu-
ropeans from countries like Italy and Poland found a legal alternative.
They began exploiting Canadian residency as an alternate means to immi-
grate; by residing in Canada for five years, these Europeans were allowed
to legally immigrate into the United States. In addition, along the southern
border, Anglo ranch owners often complained about the rough treatment
they received from Border Patrol agents. These twin developments even-
tually led to the better, more courteous treatment of Anglos and Europeans
by immigration agents, while Mexicans and other Latinos suffered the in-
dignities of a more stringent border policy and racialized politics, fueled in
part by the growing class divide between white owners and Mexican labor-
ers in the south.89
So, even though Mexicans at the time were not subject to quotas like the
Europeans or banned from naturalization and immigration like the Asians,
they became associated with illegal migration, 90 eventually giving rise to
the race-based law enforcement profile evident in Brignoni-Ponce. As
Ngai explains,
85. NGAI, supra note 76, at 64.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 60; Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
88. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
89. NGAI, supra note 76, at 64-70.
90. Id. at 71 ("It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal immigration
because, unlike Europeans, they were not subject to numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics,
they were not excluded as racially ineligible to citizenship.").
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as numerical restrictions assumed primacy in immigration policy, its en-
forcement aspects-inspection procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol,
criminal prosecution, and irregular categories of immigration--created
many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants. The undocumented la-
borer who crossed the border to work in the burgeoning industry of com-
mercial agriculture thus emerged as the prototypical illegal alien.9 1
From 1930 to 1965, Congress vacillated between deportation and legali-
zation as it attempted to craft policies that met the needs of United States
agriculture, provided sufficient protection for exploited Mexican workers,
and gave coherence to the deportation system it had created. 92 Perhaps the
symbiotic relationship between United States employers and Mexican
farm-workers may best be illustrated by the recorded numbers at the end of
the Bracero program, a migrant labor initiative begun in the 1950s. Up to
1964, the number of workers almost equaled the number of deportees, at
close to five million each.93
Also contributing to the marginalization of the Mexican border crosser
has been the war on drugs. Although the anti-drug initiative was not an
immigration policy, to the extent that it prioritized international drug
smuggling as a federal criminal concern, Congress has had to pay increa-
singly close attention to the United States-Mexico border. By the 1950s
and 1960s, Mexico supplied approximately seventy-five percent of mariju-
ana in the United States market and ten to fifteen percent of heroin.94 This
reality arguably enhanced the perception in some circles that Mexicans
were invariably ignorant, indolent, and criminal.9 5 Of course, not only
were most Mexicans not drug runners, but neither were they illegal border
crossers-many were either regular commuters or seasonal migrant work-
ers, legally employed in the United States but permanently residing in
Mexico.
96
In sum, despite the longstanding interdependence of United States em-
ployers and foreign farm-workers, the 1920s creation of the "illegal immi-
grant" through numerical restrictions, enhanced border patrol, and en-
forcement via deportation and criminal punishment, helped fuel the
public's association of undocumented migration with Mexican migration.
91. Id.
92. See DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 214-24 (2007) (describing deportation
of Mexicans from 1930-1965).
93. Id. at 224.
94. ANDREAS, supra note 84, at 40.
95. NGAI, supra note 76, at 53 ("Anti-Mexican rhetoric invariably focused on allega-
tions of ignorance, filth, indolence, and criminality.").
96. Id. at 70-71 (describing the irregular, though legal, patterns of migration some Mex-
icans engaged in, including commuting and seasonal migrant work).
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Moreover, the United States' growing concern over the war on drugs and
Mexico's notoriety as a prominent source of contraband may have further
contributed to a concern over border patrol and the perception of the Mex-
ican migrant as criminal, despite studies clearly demonstrating the higher
incidence of criminality among the native-born versus the immigrant.97 It
is no wonder then that border crossing is popularly viewed today as a crim-
inal activity requiring punishment and deterrence.
A final contributor to this misperception has been the militarization of
the border. Owing to concerns over the smuggling of drugs and humans, as
well as individual border crossings, the federal government has fortified the
United States-Mexico border substantially over the years. Despite efforts
to pass comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007, President
Bush and the 109th Congress might instead be remembered for the noto-
rious Secure Fence Act of 2006,98 which famously authorized the creation
of 700 miles of new border fence, although it was unclear that any funds
for the project were forthcoming. While praised by restrictionists for de-
creasing the number of border crossings into San Diego, California from
1999 to 2004, critics assert that the militarized border has not only deterred
seasonal migrants from returning home, but has also forced those coming
from Mexico to cross at more dangerous points through the Sonora Desert
into southern Arizona, leading to a record number of deaths in recent
years. 99 Instead of the continued fortification, migration scholar Douglas
Massey argues for increased investment in Mexico, better ports and trans-
portation, and a robust guest worker program. 00 Congress appears unde-
terred; during the summer of 2010, federal budget negotiations over war
spending had the House pressing for an additional 700 million dollars for
border security.''
97. See, e.g., RUBEN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRI-
MINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION (2007); Kristen F. Butcher & Anne Morrison
Piehl, Recent Immigrants: Unexpected Implications for Crime and Incarceration (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6067, 1997).
98. Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
99. See VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS 90-91 (2009) (describing
pros and cons of increased border security). "[The federal government's] tougher enforce-
ment measures have pushed smugglers and illegal immigrants to take their chances on iso-
lated trails through the deserts and mountains of southern Arizona, where they must some-
times walk for three or four days before reaching a road." James C. McKinley, Jr., An
Arizona Morgue Goes Crowded, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2010, at A14.
100. See Tyche Hendricks, Study: Price for Border Fence Up to $49 Billion, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 8, 2007, at B-i, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/
2 007/
01/08/BAG6RNEJJG 1.DTL.
101. See Ted Barrett & Deirdre Walsh, Senate Democrats Say House Must Cut Teachers
Money From War Spending Bill, CNN POLITICAL TICKER BLOG (July 19, 2010, 8:13 PM),
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Just as pleas for alternatives to border militarization have fallen on deaf
ears in Congress, they have apparently been politically unpalatable to the
current President, whose immigration policy seems to emphasize enforce-
ment over integration.
C. The Presidency: "Enforcement Now, Enforcement Forever"
As with other political initiatives, United States immigration enforce-
ment has waxed and waned over the years, depending on the Executive's
concerns over foreign policy, national security, and the domestic economy,
among other things. As the federal lawmaking body, Congress has been
largely responsible for setting the Executive's agenda, and yet, presidents
and their appointed officers have also been greatly influential in setting the
tone for enforcement.
This section will sample immigration leadership under two Democratic
presidents who are often compared-Franklin Delano Roosevelt ("FDR")
and Barack Obama-to get a sense of the negotiation between Congress
and the president over the execution of enacted immigration policy.' 02
Following Congress's growing concern over immigration regulation in
the 1920s and the advent of deportation and criminal sanction as the pre-
ferred enforcement mechanisms, the immigration leadership in FDR's ad-
ministration served as an important check against overzealous enforcement.
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins took seriously criticisms leveled at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) noting that "much of the
odium which has attached to the Service has been due to the policies and
methods followed in connection with deportations and removals.' ' 3 Per-
kins appointed the Ellis Island Committee to study the Service's practices;
the Committee's March 1934 report favored the need for administrative
discretion not to deport in cases of extreme hardship, for instance, where
families might be separated.'0 4 Perkins found a willing ally in the new
head of the INS, Daniel MacCormack. MacCormack vigorously lobbied
for Congress to pass legislation granting such administrative discretion, ex-
pressing the view that "illegal entry in itself is not a criterion on charac-
ter."'0 5 Indeed, he testified that "the mother who braces the hardship and
danger frequently involved in an illegal entry for purpose of rejoining her
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/07/1 9/senate-democrats-say-house-must-cut-
teachers-money-from-war-spending-bill/?fbid=GOSvXVsDsRj.
102. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, FDR 's Lessons For Obama, TIME, July 6, 2009, at 26.
103. NGAI, supra note 76, at 83.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 84.
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children cannot be held by that sole act to be a person of bad character."' 106
Because economic recovery following the Great Depression pushed immi-
gration reform to the backburner, Perkins and MacCormack creatively used
existing provisions of the law to suspend deportations and legalize undo-
cumented persons in cases of extreme hardship.
10 7
In some ways, President Obama's Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has taken a cue from Perkins and MacCormack. For instance, DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano last year decided not to deport foreign nationals
who, because of the untimely death of their United States citizen spouses,
could not adjust to permanent resident status as they had been married for
less than two years.10 8  Realizing the unfairness this created, Congress
eliminated this "widow's penalty" late last year.'0 9 Similarly, Attorney
General Eric Holder vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision
in Matter of Compean, restoring the right of deportees to claim ineffective
assistance of counsel on motions to reopen proceedings."
10
In other ways, however, much of the Obama administration's immigra-
tion strategy smacks of the mantra: "Enforcement Now, Enforcement For-
ever." Despite the DHS's insistence that it will prioritize the prosecution of
criminal noncitizens first, a study by Syracuse University's Transaction
Records Access Clearinghouse reveals that in the 2009 fiscal year, the top
two immigration crimes charged were for entries without inspection, the
modem version of the 1929 laws that first criminalized unauthorized border
106. Id.
107. See id
108. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Establishes Interim Relief for
Widows of U.S. Citizens (June 9, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr1244578412501.shtm. Similarly, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has argued strongly for
greater and more prudent exercise of prosecutorial discretion among immigration attorneys.
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 243 (2010); see also Joanna Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A
Review of Operation Streamline, 2010 C.J. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNIcITY & Di-
vERsITY 1 ("The current administration is committed to combating the drug and weapon
trafficking and human smuggling at the root of violence along the U.S.-Mexico border. But
a Bush-era immigration enforcement program called Operation Streamline threatens to un-
dermine that effort. Operation Streamline requires the federal criminal prosecution and im-
prisonment of all unlawful border crossers. The program, which mainly targets migrant
workers with no criminal history, has caused skyrocketing caseloads in many federal district
courts along the border."), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/6807.htm.
109. Kirk Semple, Measure Gives Rights to Widows of Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2009, at A19.
110. In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009) (vacating prior decision, thereby res-
toring BIA and IJ authority to review motions to reopen based on claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel).
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crossings."' Apparently, President Obama is simply continuing the policy
of his predecessors; criminal charges for entry and re-entry without inspec-
tion have been in the top three among immigration charges brought over
the last twenty years. 12 Despite this longstanding preference for charging
undocumented entries via the criminal law, a 2009 Pew Hispanic Center
report reveals that, although it has stabilized in recent years, the undocu-
mented population increased rapidly from 1990 to 2006.113 All this has on-
ly further entrenched the stereotype of the Latino man as undocumented
migrant. 114
In his July 2010 speech calling for immigration reform, enforcement and
the rule of law were again the pillars of Obama's platform.115 Rejecting
popular calls for either blanket amnesty for or aggressive deportation of all
eleven million undocumented persons currently living in the U.S., Obama
presented a middle way that, while outlining a pathway to citizenship for
the undocumented, emphasized securing the southern border, holding un-
scrupulous businesses accountable for illegal hiring, and requiring that pe-
nalties be assessed and civic responsibilities be imposed upon those want-
ing to legalize their status.116 While it is possible that Obama could only
sell amnesty to Congress and the public by emphasizing law enforcement,
111. Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels in FY 2009, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, SYRACUSE UNIV., http://trac.syr.edu/inmigration/reports/218/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
112. See id.
113. Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES, PEW HISP. CTR. (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/
reports/report.php?ReportlD= 107.
114. See, e.g., LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITI-
ZENS, AND THE NATION (2008) (arguing how fear-mongering anti-immigrant rhetoric tar-
geted at Latinos has permeated both media and popular works of late). See generally Ediber-
to Roman, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REv. 841 (2008) (decrying the nativism and
xenophobia evident in the current rhetoric surrounding Latino immigration).
115. Press release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehen-
sive Immigration Reform (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform [hereinafter Remarks on Im-
migration Reform]. Even among conservatives, the question of comprehensive immigration
reform is a tricky one. Compare Conservatives for Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (July 18, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/iimmigration/
2010/07/conservatives-for-immigration-reform.html, with Edwin Meese III, An Amnesty By
Any Other Name... , N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/05/24/opinion/24meese.html (arguing against amnesty; Meese, the Attorney General
who signed on to Reagan's 1986 amnesty, asserts: "The fair and sound policy is to give
those who are here illegally the opportunity to correct their status by returning to their coun-
try of origin and getting in line with everyone else. This, along with serious enforcement
and control of the illegal inflow at the border-a combination of incentives and disincen-
tives-will significantly reduce over time our population of illegal immigrants.").
116. See Remarks on Immigration Reform, supra note 115.
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it remains to be seen whether bringing undocumented workers out of the
shadows so that they eventually become full citizens becomes the corner-
stone of a more just immigration policy, or just a front for stricter border
and interior enforcement." 
7
Historically, crossing international borders was not a crime. Nativist
fears, the rise of nation-states, and concerns over economics and national
security prompted a shift to a numbers-based United States immigration
policy in the 1920s. Criminalization of border crossings soon followed, as
did the growing perception that Mexicans were the prototypical "illegal
aliens," despite their relatively favored immigration status compared to Eu-
ropeans and Asians at the time. Congressional and presidential concern
over human and drug trafficking led to the increasing militarization of the
southern border, aided by the Supreme Court's blessing of racial profiling
as a constitutionally sound tool in identifying undocumented migrants.
And yet, this enforcement-heavy approach has not seemed to curtail undo-
cumented migration significantly, but instead, has arguably encouraged
states such as Arizona to pass their own immigration ordinances, further
perpetuating anti-Mexican sentiment.
The next section advocates a different approach that takes enforcement
seriously by arguing for the decriminalization of border crossings. Doing
so would help restore balance to an immigration system that should reserve
sanctions for those whose non-border-crossing criminal conduct merits
such punishment.
Il1. AN ALTERNATIVE: DECRIMINALIZING BORDER CROSSINGS
Criminalizing border crossings violates the basic premise of criminal
law that the punishment fit the crime. Historically, it was not until 1929
that border crossing was deemed a criminal act; civil deportations, though
hugely disruptive, did not involve incarceration as a punishment for immi-
gration violations. In a sense, deporting individuals for disobeying civil
immigration law simply holds migrants to the terms of their bargain with
the United States: failure to comply with conditions of entry means that the
person would not be permitted to remain. 118 Keeping only the civil remedy
117. The reason for skepticism is real. The New York Times recently reported that the
Obama administration has silently begun conducting audits of businesses, forcing them to
fire all undocumented workers. See Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from Jobs in 'Silent
Raids,'N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at Al.
118. I should make clear that I do not endorse this "immigration as contract" view, al-
though I believe it best expresses the realities of current United States policy. See ROMERO,
supra note 99, at ch. 1. I would prefer either a more open admissions policy, e.g., KEviN R.
JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND
IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007), or one that better facilitates the transition from foreigner to citi-
2010] 299
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
for immigration violations--deportation-while discarding all criminal
sanctions for undocumented border crossings enhances United States im-
migration policy in several concrete ways.
First, decriminalizing border crossings helps restore order and balance to
what should be a civil, not criminal, immigration system only. As FDR's
INS Chief MacCormack noted, there is nothing inherently immoral about a
person entering the U.S. without inspection.119 Treating border crossers as
civil law violators allows immigration agents and adjudicators the opportu-
nity to treat each case on an individual basis, balancing hardship against
transgression, without the stigma of possible criminal sanction coloring the
decision-maker's judgment. To update MacCormack's hypothetical, with
today's militarized border funneling migrant workers across the Sonoran
Desert, very few would find a mother's decision to risk such a dangerous
trek to be reunited with her children unworthy of sympathy.
Second, decriminalizing border crossings helps the perennially unders-
taffed and underfunded immigration agencies better channel scarce re-
sources by prioritizing targets. If entry without inspection is no longer a
crime, immigration authorities can help other federal law enforcement of-
ficers focus on true migrant threats, for instance, those who smuggle drugs
and weapons across the border, often bringing violence in their wake.
Third, decriminalizing border crossings will enhance the United States'
image abroad. When a nation committed to equality and due process is
able to extend fair treatment to foreign guests, other countries begin to re-
spect and trust it, rather than worry about whether its actions will betray its
words.
Finally, decriminalizing border crossings should help heal our racially-
polarized discourse over immigration policy and change the culture for the
better. Over time, society will come to understand entry without inspection
for what it is-not a crime, but a desperate act of persons forced to leave
everything familiar to begin a new life in a foreign land.
A critic might balk at the thought of emasculating immigration authori-
ties by depriving them of the ability to charge suspected criminal migrants
with a strict liability crime. Criminally charging someone with entry with-
out inspection saves law enforcement the trouble of having to prove the in-
tent-mens rea-to commit a crime when the evidence is not readily avail-
able. However, as Joshua Dressler correctly observes, "[m]ost modem
zen, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LAST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006). I also firmly believe that, like any remedy,
deportation should be weighed against compelling individual circumstances meriting excep-
tion, for maintaining family unity, for example.
119. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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criminal law scholars look unkindly upon the abandonment of the mens rea
requirement" because criminally punishing people for bad intent "is consis-
tent with the retributive principle that one who does not choose to cause so-
cial harm, and who is not otherwise morally to blame for its commission,
does not deserve to be punished."' 121 In contrast, those few who favor strict
liability in criminal law generally believe that there is some utilitarian ben-
efit to society as a whole that outweighs the unfairness to the accused, es-
pecially since the attendant penalties are typically slight.
1 21
In the context of immigration law, this rationale becomes difficult to fa-
thom, given that deportation is a readily available civil remedy for entry
without inspection. Even in the context of recidivists, it would be better to
ascertain the reasons for the repeated unauthorized crossings rather than to
simply assume criminal intent. Further, current criminal statutes for entry
without inspection carry with them the stigma of a federal misdemeanor at
best, 122 and a federal felony conviction at worst. 123 Finally, despite the vi-
gorous enforcement 2 4 of these criminal immigration provisions over the
last twenty years, undocumented migration has continued largely unabated,
as the Pew Hispanic Center's recent report suggests.1 25 Strict liability does
not appear to be a particularly attractive option within the immigration law
context.126
CONCLUSION: BORDERING ON JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS
Instead of bordering on law, United States immigration policy should
border on justice and fairness. This requires shifting focus from categorical
laws that automatically deem all border crossers as criminals, to having
faith that our current administrative laws will suffice. Doing so will restore
balance to the civil immigration system, conserve scarce enforcement re-
120. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 148 (5th ed. 2009).
121. Id.
122. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
123. Immigration and Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
125. See supra text accompanying note 113.
126. One might argue that even under the current criminal border crossing statutes, the
government must prove intent to cross into the United States illegally, which satisfies mens
rea. However, like MacCormack, I see nothing inherently wrong in intending to cross the
border without documents, especially if one's "choice" is based on necessity, like the moth-
er wishing to be reunited with her child. Thus, I favor requiring government to prove some
other criminal intent-like the intent to transport illegal contraband-if it wishes to crimi-
nally prosecute a border crosser, but to otherwise treat all other garden-variety border cross-
ers under the existing administrative law regime.
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sources to target truly criminal behavior, enhance our standing abroad, and
help heal our racially-polarized discourse on immigration policy.
Although the Puritan immigrants did not always do right by the Native
Americans whose lands they invaded, Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor
John Winthrop expressed a vision of a civilized society worth aspiring to in
the following words: "We must delight in each other, make others' condi-
tions our own, rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together,
always having before our eyes our community as members of the same
body."'127 Choosing an immigration policy that treats noncitizens fairly re-
flects well upon the body politic as a whole.
127. See DON HAWKINSON, CHARACTER FOR LIFE: AN AMERICAN HERITAGE 155 (2005)
(quoting Winthrop's "A Model of Christian Charity" sermon). Recently, The Economist
decried the over-criminalization of United States law, arguing that "[a]cts that can be regu-
lated should not be criminalised [sic]." Rough Justice, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 13.
Immigration law violations that can be handled within administrative law, like border cross-
ings, arguably fit the bill.
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